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 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, PENSION REFORM AND EMERGING SECURITIES
MARKETS
1. Introduction
1. Institutional investors have been growing in size dramatically over the past decades. Total assets
under management of OECD institutional investors rose from  38 per cent of GDP in 1981 to around 106.5
per cent in 1995.  The increasing importance of institutional investors as holders of financial assets means
that their impact on the functioning of financial markets is steadily growing. Vice versa, their reliance on
well-functioning of financial markets has also increased. In most OECD countries, institutional saving
institutions -- in particular pension funds -- now play a key role in domestic financial systems
1.
2. The involvement of institutional investors in capital market transactions is increasing in tandem
with their growing financial clout.  A strong community of institutional investors seems to be a precondition
for the development of liquid securities markets with sophisticated financial vehicles.  In view of the growing
influence that institutional investors exert on the structure and modus operandi of capital markets, the
importance of capital markets for the real economy, corporate finance, and income security, it may be
necessary for policy makers to take a closer look at the functioning and the regulation of these institutions.
A full analysis would include the functioning and regulation of the fund management profession, the impact
of changes in demography and the regulation of pension schemes on the efficiency of the allocation of
savings, the influence of the international portfolio diversification of institutional investors, and the impact of
tax regimes on the behaviour of institutional investors.  Also the consequences of investment practices of
institutional investors for the functioning of financial markets may need to be analysed.
3. Also in emerging financial markets the importance of institutional investors (both foreign and
domestic ones) is steadily increasing. In particular pension reform has been an important factor in
developing a domestic institutional sector in emerging market economies. This in turn has been a major force
in the further development of securities markets. However, there is still considerable scope for promoting the
growth of securities markets through the development of insurance companies and domestic mutual and
pension funds. The paper will discuss the range of factors that can stimulate the further development of the
domestic institutional sector, in particular through pension system reform measures. In doing so, the
development of the institutional sector in emerging market economies will be compared with the experience
in the OECD area, focusing in particular on  the key factors that have been (and are) driving the growth of
OECD institutional investor activities and the impact of institutional investors on securities markets.
4. In addition, the paper will identify obstacles in the development of the institutional sector in
emerging markets and suggest policies to deal with these problems. It will be argued that these policies are
also beneficial for the growth of the securities market.  However, this is not sufficient. The efficient
operation of  institutional investors such as pension funds, requires the presence of a supporting securities
market infrastructure. The paper will outline the key infrastructural elements and the associated financial
policies,  at both the micro and macro levels.  In addition, attention will be paid to the more general5
conditions (macroeconomic stability, tax regime, property right laws, bankruptcy legislation, privatisation of
state-owned enterprises ) that can be expected to promote the development of securities markets.
5. The paper is organised as follows. An overview of the development of institutional investors in the
main OECD regions and countries is given in section 2. Section 3 will discuss the development of the
institutional sector in emerging market economies  in Latin America, Asia and the transition countries in
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and its impact on the growth of the securities market. These
developments will be compared with the experience in the OECD area by focusing on the key factors that
have been (and are) driving the growth of OECD institutional sector activities and the impact of the
institutional sector on securities market development. Obstacles in developing an institutional sector in
emerging market economies will be identified in section 4. Policies how to deal with these obstacles will also
be suggested, in particular through a programme of pension system reform. Section 5 outlines the key
infrastructural elements of a well-functioning securities market and the  associated financial policies. In
addition, the more general conditions that can be expected to promote the development of securities markets
will also be identified. The final section presents policy conclusions.
2. Overview of the Growth of the Institutional Sector in the OECD Area
The importance of institutional investors is steadily increasing.  Total institutional assets of the main regions
in the OECD area rose from $3.2 trillion in 1981 (i.e. 38 per cent of GDP), to $16.3 trillion in 1991 (90 per
cent of GDP), to more than $24.3 trillion in 1995 (106.5 per cent of GDP).  In the period 1990-95, average
annual growth of holding by all categories of institutional investors has been spectacular [see Chart 1].6
Chart 1



























6. Pension funds, insurance companies, and investment companies in the Group of Seven countries
had close to $17.5 trillion in assets under management in 1995.  In comparison, the global equity market in
1993 amounted to $14.1 trillion, and the total outstanding stock of government debt in the Group of Seven
countries was $9 trillion [2].  In the period 1980 - 1993, the aggregate assets of institutional investors in the
United States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom and Canada have increased by more than 400 per cent and
have more than doubled as a percent of GDP ; at the end of 1995, aggregate institutional assets in the G-5
countries were around $20.4 trillion or 119 per cent of GDP. G-7 aggregate institutional assets stood at
$21.3 trillion at the end of 1995 or 113 per cent of GDP, while recording strong growth for all categories of
institutional investors [see Chart 2].  Other OECD countries have recorded similar changes in total assets
under management.7
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7. Pension funds and insurance companies have traditionally been the most important institutional
investors in OECD capital markets.  Although they still control very sizeable (and still growing) asset
portfolios, the asset growth of investment companies has been even more spectacular. It is estimated that
mutual funds alone accounted for about $3.3 trillion in 1994 [3].  Investment companies assets have
increased at a much faster pace than have the assets of other institutional investors.  Assets of investment
funds amounted to $5.2 trillion in 1995, a growth of 19 per cent over the 1990-1995 period; the total share
of assets under management of investment funds increased from 18 per cent in 1990 to 22 per cent in 19958
[see Chart 3].  Total assets under management of hedge funds stood at an estimated $75-100 billion in 1994,
a doubling since 1991 [4], and have further grown to an estimated $236 billion in 1995.
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8. Another noteworthy trend is the changes in the share of foreign securities in the portfolios of
institutional investors.  There is a gradual but clear trend toward internationally diversified portfolios of
pension funds.  The behaviour of life insurance companies and investment companies is less clear. In fact,
their international diversification shows some decrease in the 1990s. The portfolios of insurance companies
are less diversified than those of pension funds.  There are important differences in the share of foreign
securities in the portfolio of OECD investment companies:  (a) the portfolios of mutual funds in Canada,
Germany and the United Kingdom are more internationally diversified than in the United States and Japan;
(b) possibly related to the previous point, US mutual funds show a clear trend toward increased international
diversification, while in other countries this trend has levelled off or even declined somewhat; (c) mutual
funds in the larger OECD countries are significantly more diversified than insurance companies and pension
funds.9
Table 1: Institutional Investor's Holdings of securities issued by non-residents
( in percent of total assets)
1980 1988 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Pension funds
Canada
(1) 4.6 5.9 6.4 8.6 10.2 11.6 12.9 13.4
Germany
(2)





0.5 6.3 7.2 8.4 8.4 9.0 .. ..
United Kingdom 7.9 16.3 17.8 20.6 19.5 20.0 19.8 19.8
USA
(2)
0.7 2.7 4.2 4.1 4.6 5.7 .. ..
Life insurance companies
Canada
(1) 0.3 1.5 1.1 1.2 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.3
Germany
(2)
0.6 0.6 1.0 1.0 .. .. .. ..
Japan
(4) .. .. 13.5 12.5 11.4 9.0 6.7 6.9
United Kingdom 4.1 9.4 10.7 12.2 12.4 13.3 13.5 14.2
USA
(2)
4.1 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.7 .. .. ..
Mutual funds
Canada
(1) 19.9 19.4 17.5 16.1 17.0 20.4 23.6 23.4
Germany .. .. .. .. .. 24.8 20.3 20.2
Japan
(2) (5)
.. 9.1 7.9 13.0 9.9 .. .. ..
United Kingdom 17.9 33.0 31.0 34.3 35.2 35.8 36.4 34.5
USA
(2)
.. .. 6.6 .. 10.1 .. .. ..
(1) Non-resident investment
(2) Source: International Capital Markets, IMF, Washington D.C. 1995
(3) Source: EFRP
(4) Only bills & bonds
(5) Investment trusts
Sources: Statistics Canada, Deutsche Bundesbank, Bank of Japan, Office for National Statistics, and OECD staff estimates.
Increasing institutional and functional overlaps
9. The analysis of these general trends and developments is complicated by the fact that increasingly
there are a number of institutional and functional overlaps between the different categories of institutional
investors.  World-wide deregulation in the financial sector industry and revolutionary technological
developments have eroded the statutory and physical barriers between banks, other financial intermediaries
and the securities industry.  The same forces that are contributing to financial sector integration are also
increasingly affecting institutional investors.  The process of integrating institutional investor operations into
the more “traditional” financial sector activities is being strengthened by the growing influence of the
professional fund managers
2.
10. Firstly, the links between banks and institutional investors have grown stronger over time.  Banks
have moved on a wide scale into the investment fund business, also in OECD countries with non-universal
banking systems.  Secondly, deregulation and the liberalisation of the rules governing the operation of
financial institutions have encouraged the formation of financial conglomerates in which banks and
insurance companies offer the widest possible array of services [5].  This integrated financial activity is
often called bancassurance.  Not all OECD countries allow such integration.  For example, in the United
States’ and Japan’s regulations, separating banks from insurance companies is still intact, although bank
sales of insurance products have expanded rapidly in recent years in the United States.  Thirdly, larger
insurance companies that can afford the services of large professional asset management teams are
increasingly moving into the investment fund business, either by developing "unit-linked" insurance products
or by launching investment fund companies that offer financial products also to clients that are not10
necessarily insurance policy holders. Another development is the so-called alternative risk transfer market,
where insurance risk is transferred on investment instruments such as catastrophe futures. Fourthly, even
insurance companies and pension funds that cannot afford a full-fledged professional asset management
team have usually strong links to the financial sector because they are employing outside teams to invest and
manage their assets.
3. Role of  the Institutional Sector in Emerging Securities Markets
11. Securities markets in emerging market economies are developing at a rapid pace. It is estimated by
the International Finance Corporation (IFC) that in 1996 over 60 developing countries have stock markets,
compared with half that number in 1985.
3  The combined stock market capitalisation of  these countries has
increased more than ten-fold over the past decade, from US$ 171 billion  in 1985 to US$ 1.9 trillion in 1995.
The 18 major emerging market economies that constituted the IFC Emerging Markets Index (IFCI) had a
combined market capitalisation in 1996 of US$ 1.4 trillion, 14 times higher than it was in 1985, while the
average market capitalisation rose from 7 to 40 per cent of GDP.
The role of foreign institutional investors
12. Foreign  institutional investors have had a major impact on the development of securities markets4,
notably stock markets.  There has been a dramatic increase of portfolio flows from institutional investors
into emerging markets, with professionally managed investment funds taking the lead. However, this is a
relatively recent phenomenon. It has only been since the mid- 1980s that closed-end investment funds
(including country funds) began to invest in emerging stock markets. In 1986, there were only 19 emerging
market country funds and 9 regional or global emerging market funds. By 1995, the picture has changed
dramatically with 505 country funds and 773 regional and global emerging market funds, of which around
50 per cent open-ended.  The combined assets of all closed- and open-end emerging market funds increased
from US$ 1.0 billion in 1986 to US$ 132 billion in mid-1996 5.
13. Pension fund investment in emerging financial markets is an even more recent phenomenon.  Total
holdings of emerging securities markets assets by OECD institutional investors is relatively low. Surveys
suggest that US pension funds and mutual funds currently have about 2  per cent of their assets invested in
emerging markets. Emerging market exposure of UK pension funds  and mutual funds is somewhat higher
(3-4 per cent) but Japanese  and continental European institutional investors  have negligible emerging
market assets in their portfolios. All the evidence  points to the fact that all types of institutional investors
are much less internationally diversified  than the world market portfolio. Several reasons for this home bias
have been identified in the literature6. Some of  them are rational (e.g. additional risk) or policy-determined
(e.g. prudential regulations)  but -- on balance -- there  seems to  considerable scope for increasing the share
of emerging securities  market assets in the portfolios of OECD institutional investors. In addition it should
be noted that the international investment behaviour of pension funds, insurance companies and investment
funds differs because of  the different structure of  their liabilities (this is in large part reflected in the
regulatory structure; see ANNEX I for an overview).
14. Foreign institutional investors have played an important catalyst role in the improvement of the
institutional infrastructure of emerging market economies. This has undoubtedly contributed to the most
recent development in which domestic institutional investors are starting to play an increasingly important
role. However, their role is as yet  fairly modest and, therefore,  there  is considerable scope for an expansion
of both the domestic institutional sector and the domestic securities market. In order to get a  better11
understanding of  the scope for expansion and policies to promote them, a two-pronged approach will be
followed. In the remainder of this section  the  OECD experience will be analysed in order to identify the
main factors driving the growth of the domestic institutional sector in the OECD area. This should be helpful
to get a first idea about the scope for expansion as well as  required policy actions to promote the domestic
institutional sector.  Against this backdrop, the second step is to examine in the next section the main
obstacles to the expansion of the domestic institutional sector.
Forces shaping the role, structure and modus operandi of OECD institutional investors
15. The overview in the previous section  shows very clearly that OECD institutional investors as a
group have vastly expanded their economic sphere of influence.  Yet, institutional investors are by no means
a monolithic group, since they have different investment objectives and fiduciary mandates, operate under
different regulatory and tax regimes  (see ANNEX  I), and have a different tolerance to risk. The nature of
the liabilities of the different types of institutional investors is a key determinant of their behaviour, including
their investment activities  (ANNEX I).  Nonetheless, it is possible to identify a number of major structural
factors driving the growth of institutional investors as a group:
Deregulation of the financial sector
16. Deregulation of the banking and securities industries since the beginning 1980s has heightened
competition between and among banks and other financial institutions
7. Abolishment of cross-border capital
flow restrictions has further increased competition.  New capital standards for banks were introduced in the
same period.  In response to these pressures, banks have massively expanded, or moved into, the insurance
and investment fund business in search of new activities that generate earnings in the form of commissions
and fees, while they do not necessarily absorb additional capital.
Liberalisation of the institutional sector
17. Liberalisation of the activities of institutional investors, both in terms of the production and
distribution of their respective products and the investment of their assets.  An important aspect of the
liberalisation process is the relaxation of regulatory constraints on cross-border activities and investments.
Demography, pension systems reform and financial markets
18. The rising needs for retirement benefits of a rapidly ageing population in conjunction with more
sophisticated and wealthier private  investors have had a significant impact on the growth of demand by
private households for retirement  benefit offered by the different types of financial institutions -- banks,
insurance companies, and investment  products  funds.
Advances in communications and information technology
19. Spectacular technological advances in communications and information technology enhanced the
capacity of the financial sector, the professional fund managers, and the institutional investor community to
use the opportunities offered by the liberalised environment.  Advances in technology have enabled funds to
be managed at lower costs.  More reliable and efficient clearing and settlements systems for securities and12
payments, the creation and use of complex new financial products for risk management purposes, and the
integration of capital markets have been important factors underpinning the spectacular growth of the
managed assets of institutional investors, in particular, mutual fund assets.
The role of the fund management industry
20. The increasingly active role of the fund or money management profession has made important
contributions to the transformation and dramatic expansion of the institutional investor industry.  The
management of funds by these professionals has common, technical features on the operational side, but the
exact strategy and specific objectives are adapted to the specific institutional set-up.
21. When discussing the forces shaping the investment behaviour of institutional investors it is
conceptually important to make a distinction between the legal and economic definition of the different types
of "institutional investors", on the one hand, and the professional fund managers who develop asset
allocation strategies and take investment decisions, on the other.  The fund management profession is an
important driving force behind the increasing sophistication of the investment strategies of institutional
investors.  Individual and institutional investors have increasingly delegated the management of their
portfolios to professional fund managers.  The role of the fund management profession is therefore a key
factor in analysing the relationship between institutional investors and financial markets
8.
Financial integration
22. Financial integration is proceeding at a rapid pace fuelled by financial market liberalisation and
modernisation, advances in information and communication technology, and the increase in international
diversification of portfolios of the OECD institutional sector. In addition, there are important recent policy
initiatives such as NAFTA and EMU that have given a major push to financial integration, first at the
regional level and subsequently at the global level  There is a dynamic two-way process in which the
expansion of the institutional sector is fostering financial integration while at the same time financial
integration is having a profound impact on  the investment behaviour of the institutional sector.
Scope for the development of a domestic institutional investor base in emerging securities markets
23. The structural factors behind the growth of  institutional assets in the OECD area have hardly
started to play a role in emerging markets. Hence, the scope for the development of the institutional sector
and the domestic capital market is enormous.
Deregulation and modernisation of the financial sector
24. Deregulation and modernisation of the financial sector are relatively recent phenomena in emerging
markets. The Latin American banking landscape has been shaped to a large measure by frequent banking
crises
9. Latin American financial markets are highly volatile. Institutional investors have reacted to financial
fragility and volatility by holding short-term assets. Depository institutions, banks and savings institutions
issuing deposit-like liabilities, are the major investment vehicles for Latin American domestic institutional
savings. Chile is the exception, with pension and insurance funds accounting for around 44 per cent of
institutional savings. Moreover, only in Chile are capital-market instruments (including fixed-income
securities) a substantial source of funds for the private sector
10 .13
25. Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR  are special cases because of their unique
initial conditions (chief among them the complete absence in 1989 of  both market-based financial
institutions and an institutional investor base). Although the transformation of the financial sector is in full
swing, many problems remain
11 . It can therefore be expected that continued progress in the restructuring
and modernisation of the banking sector (as well as a reduction in macro-economic volatility) will
significantly contribute to the involvement of banks in institutional sector activities, including money
management services. Moreover, the transformation of the banking sector in transition economies and
elsewhere is a sine qua non  for the emergence of capital markets as important intermediaries of liquid long-
term funds to the private sector
12.  Indeed, Latin American experiences provide evidence that building
confidence in institutional savings  is closely related to building confidence in the banking system
13 . Thus,
the further development  of a domestic institutional investor base is in large part dependent on success in
establishing sound banking systems.
26. The deregulation and modernisation of the financial sector in emerging Asian market economies is
in many respects further advanced than in other emerging market areas. Equity and bond markets are
relatively well-developed [see Table 2] and have grown strongly in the last decade. For example, in Malaysia
and Thailand the share of equity markets in the stock of financial savings increased, respectively, from 49
per cent and 9 per cent at the end of 1985 to 79 per cent and 56 per cent at the end of 1994
14 .  Asian bond
markets have been growing strongly in large measure in response to the huge infrastructure investment
requirements
15 . The increasing supply of long-term capital market instruments is supporting the
development of a domestic institutional investor base in emerging Asian economies. Moreover, increased
competition among banks have encouraged them moving into capital market activities (including fund
management services) to boost fee income. However, turmoil in Asian financial markets in 1997 has
demonstrated  a number of structural weaknesses in the financial sector, chief among them bank fragility.
The recent cyclical downturn in several Asian countries has exposed structural weaknesses in their banking
systems
16 .14
Table 2. Securities Markets
Liberalisation of the institutional sector
27. Liberalisation of the activities (production, distribution, investment of assets) of the domestic
institutional sector has hardly begun in emerging markets. The agenda for liberalisation will be reviewed in
section 4 by identifying major obstacles to the development of  a domestic institutional investor base.
Demography and pension reform
28. Demographic developments in conjunction with (the need for) pension reform are perhaps the most
important determinants of the (future) growth of the domestic institutional sector in emerging market
economies.












India 35.0 93.4 12.6 56.9 6.2 24.1 18.5 22.4 57.5
East Asia
   Indonesia 13.5 32.6 7.6 33.9 35.4 29.4 1.6 6.0 10.0
   Korea 91.4 105.4 44.0 40.2 12.8 171.6 19.7 24.1
4 43.0
   Malaysia 196.5 352.6 113.8 265.0 13.6 62.3 59.9 51.2 32.6
   Taiwan 83.2 134.7 62.3 74.0 23.4 353.5 5.6 13.6 1 840.0




   Argentina 9.4 30.4
6 2.4 13.4 47.7 28.1 7.0 18.3
6 600.0
6
   Brazil 11.9 66.6 3.7 26.2 77.6 83.4
   Chile 54.5 155.8 44.9 109.4 57.7 9.5 9.6 18.4 275.4
   Colombia 22.8 34.4 3.5 23.9 52.5 17.8 1.6 4.9
   Mexico 44.6 73.9 14.1 36.3 56.4 46.5 8.7 2.9 32.9
   Venezuela 22.4 18.2 17.2 4.9 80.7 20.2 5.2 11.1
United States 203.7 244.5 56.3 94.7 7.4 69.7 108.3 123.4 1 460.0
5
Japan 189.5 178.2 99.5 72.1 13.2 32.4 78.0 88.4 250.0
5
Germany 88.9 132.7 21.6 23.9 61.9 97.8 70.1 85.6 2 120.0
5
1Where available, including short-term money market instruments, government bonds, corporate bonds
and equities at market value.
2 Percentage share of the ten most active stocks in the total value traded in
1994. For the United States and Japan, share of total volume traded.
3 Total value traded as a percentage
of average market capitalisation in 1994.
4 1995.
5 Government bonds only.
6 1993.
Source: Bank for International Settlements, 66th Annual Report, June 1996, BIS.15
29. During the debt crises of the 1980s, Latin American social securities systems experienced major
problems:  underfunding, falling real pensions, increasing evasion and large social security deficits. 
17  In
1981 Chile took the lead in implementing a radical pension reform programme which replaced the PAYG
system by a fully funded system based on individual capitalisation accounts.  Encouraged by Chile’s
success, the movement to reform pension systems gained momentum in the region [see Table 3].
Table 3:  A Summary of Latin American Pension System Reforms



















































































































































Source:  All data from Mitchell and Barreto (1997) except items with [*]  from Superintencia Admn. Privado de
Fondos de Pensiones del Peru (1996).
30. Among other emerging markets, large funded pension systems exist in relatively few countries.  In
Asia the pension systems of Singapore and Malaysia are centrally managed by national provident funds.
Indonesia and India have funded schemes that are mostly based on company plans. Korea and the
Philippines have partially funded public pension systems.  Except for Singapore and Malaysia, pension
assets in terms of GDP are relatively low in Asia.  For example, in Korea they stood at around 3.1 per cent
in 1995.
18
31. In the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR, funded pension
systems hardly exist.  Only three countries in Eastern Europe have adopted legislation for regulating the
activities of private pension funds.
19  Other countries have prepared drafts of new laws or simply have laws
allowing the existence of private pension funds but not their regulation.
20








Hungary 211 300 0.40
Czech Republic 44 1 200 0.14
Russia 1 000 n.a. 0.05
Slovak Republic 0 0 0.00
Source:  G. Impavido, Pension Funds and Stock Market Development in Eastern Europe:  Is there A Link?  EIB
Report 97/03, Luxembourg.
32. The size of the pension sector in most emerging market economies is very small [see Tables 3 and
4].  This reflects differences in some regions (Asia, Latin America) between the demographic structure of
these regions and the OECD area.  However, transition economies have a demographic structure very similar
to the OECD countries.
21  In sum, the relative small size of the pension sector in emerging markets provides
a first indication of its scope for expansion through pension reform and the removal of obstacles in other
areas (notably the financial sector)
22.  Advances in information and communication technology and the role
of professional fund managers are key ingredients of a modern capital market infrastructure for supporting a
dynamic domestic institutional sector.  These factors will be discussed in Section 5.
Financial Integration
33. The pace of financial integration is still gathering speed.  Net private capital flows to emerging
markets exceeded $265 billion in 1996, nearly six times greater than they were at the beginning of the
decade.  Private flows are now five times the size of official flows.
23  The driving force behind the portfolio
flows of the 1990s has been OECD institutional investors.  Among institutional investors, mutual funds led
the rapid growth in investments in emerging market equities.
24 However, increasingly it is the expansion of
the OECD pension sector that is the main financial muscle behind the continued flow of capital into
emerging markets, investing through mutual funds or directly on their own account.  Total international
investments by pension funds (mostly in the form of portfolio equities) more than doubled from $302 billion
in 1989 to $790 billion in 1994.
25
34. Integration enhances the depth and efficiency of the domestic financial system, in particular the
capital market.  This in turn improves the conditions for an expansion of the domestic institutional sector.
The pace of change will be especially rapid for emerging economies, given their more insulated financial
markets.  Structural reforms in emerging markets (privatisation, pension reform, modernisation of the
banking sector, etc.), technological change and financial innovations, financial deregulation and major
demographic shifts in OECD countries, are major reasons for expecting that rapid financial integration will
continue.
26
The size of the institutional sector and the development of the capital market
35. The expansion of the institutional sector has an important impact on the development of the
domestic capital market 
27 The OECD experience demonstrates how the growth of the institutional sector
has contributed to the modernisation of, and a stronger role for, capital markets.  An expansion of the
domestic institutional sector in emerging market economies will therefore give a similar impetus to the
development of the domestic securities market.  Important dimensions of this development are the following:17
Market Liquidity
36. The growth of the institutional sector has had a profound effect on capital market structure and
corporate finance behaviour in the OECD area
28.  Institutional investors are very much interested in market
liquidity  -- i.e. the ability to transact in large size without moving the price against them and at low
transaction costs.  They demand therefore a market infrastructure characterised by specialised wholesale
markets which can process large transactions very rapidly and contribute to liquidity
29. Market liquidity is a
key requirement of the larger institutional investors.  Institutional trading and investment strategies demand
the existence of sophisticated and liquid financial markets. Consequently, the quest for liquidity has changed
dramatically the micro-structure of financial markets. Four dimensions of liquidity can be distinguished:
  -  width, determined by the bid-ask spread for a given number of securities;
  -  depth, the amount of securities that can be traded at given bid and ask quotes;
  -  immediacy, the amount of time to carry out a transaction;
  -  resiliency, the time it takes before prices revert to former levels after a large order has been
absorbed by the market.
37. Through sophisticated trading and investment strategies, institutional investors can create
additional liquidity in the form of arbitrage activities and diversification of investor portfolios.  Liquidity
might also be aided by reduction in commissions and other transactions costs, that institutional investors are
well placed to press for.  Increases in market liquidity should in turn be beneficial more generally to the
efficiency of financial markets, and lead to a reduction in the cost of capital.
38. Liquidity is a form of economy of scale and therefore the larger financial centres have a
competitive edge, even with similar technology.  Relative liquidity is reflected in transaction sizes [11].  In
some countries, the growth of institutional investors -- in particular pension funds -- has encouraged the
development of off-exchange "block trading".  This in turn may entail a tiering of markets, with order-driven
and heavily regulated domestic markets dedicated to retail investors and small company stocks.  Institutional
investors have more power than small investors to press for the lowest possible transaction costs, thereby
boosting liquidity [12]. Total transaction costs consist of indirect trading costs (determined by the liquidity
of the market: the higher market liquidity, the lower indirect trading costs) and direct trading costs
(determined by the structure of transaction fees ).  Institutional investors will seek to minimise total trading
costs [13].
Financial system structure
39. Institutional investors have also had an impact on the overall structure of financial markets.
Countries with large funded pension schemes (e.g. United Kingdom, United States) tend to have highly
developed securities markets, while capital markets are relatively underdeveloped (in particular the equity
market) in countries with small pension-fund sectors (e.g. Germany, Italy).  Given their focus on real
returns, pension funds should be particularly beneficial to the development of equity markets [14].  Although
pension funds could in principle also develop by providing loans and investments in real estate, their greatest
comparative advantage is in the capital markets.  Loans require monitoring, so the customer relationship
probably gives banks a  competitive edge.  In contrast, trading and the pooling of risks are more efficiently
undertaken in capital markets, where transactions costs are lower.18
40. The growth of a dynamic institutional sector may contribute to a stronger role of capital market
intermediation in so-called bank-based financial systems (e.g. Germany, Japan, the Netherlands).  In
particular, pension funds that are investing significant parts of their portfolios in equities would pressure for
changes in laws and regulations of companies that usually can be found in "bank dominated" financial
systems.  In addition to a modernisation of the capital market infrastructure, pension funds can be expected
to push for a move to laws and practices that would better protect the interests of equity holders.  These
include take-over codes, insider information restrictions, limits on dual classes of shares which seek to
protect minority shareholders, as well as equal treatment of creditors in bankruptcy to protect their holdings
of corporate bonds.
41. The resulting modernisation of the capital market might further encourage the larger corporations
to shift from bank financing to securities markets.  However, similar access to capital markets is not
available for the smaller enterprises.  This in turn may re-enforce the development that bank lending is being
increasingly concentrated in the smaller and medium-size enterprise sector, even in so-called bank dominated
OECD countries.
Demand for capital market instruments and innovations
42. Institutional investors can influence the demand for capital market instruments in several ways:
(i) by increasing the total supply of saving, (ii) by influencing the personal sector's portfolio distribution
between bank deposits and securities, and (iii) via the institutional sector's own portfolio choices.
43. Most studies indicate that institutionalisation has a small impact on total personal saving [15],
although some studies suggest a larger effect [16].  Most authors have come to the conclusion that the
growth of institutional investors increases the total supply of long term funds, and may reduce bank deposits,
but that total savings do not increase or only marginally.
44. The personal sector tends to hold a much larger proportion of liquid assets than the institutional
sector.  Institutional investors hold a greater proportion of their assets in the form of long-term assets than
households;  also, the personal sector's foreign asset holdings are relatively minor.  These differences can
partly be explained by the following factors [17]:
a) Households have relatively short time horizons.  Most institutional investors (in particular,
pension funds and life insurance companies) have long-term liabilities.  They tend therefore to
concentrate portfolios on long-term assets such as equity and property yielding higher returns.
b) Institutional investors have a comparative advantage in compensating for the increased risk of
holding domestic and foreign equities, by pooling across assets that are imperfectly correlated.
45. The institutionalisation of savings implies therefore a shift in composition of the portfolios of the
household sector.  The demand for capital market instruments by the institutional sector is the outcome of
portfolio optimisation  -- seeking an optimal risk/return profile  -- taking into account the nature of its
liabilities, tax factors and regulatory regimes.  It has been suggested that in recent years the biggest impulse
to the supply of long-term funds has come from pension funds (part of the growth of mutual funds is due to
investments by pension funds and/or the growth of personal pension plans).
46. These shifts in portfolios imply that securities are increasingly held by large, informed investors.
This in turn means that their behaviour should be strongly influenced by relative asset returns, particularly19
when there are relatively few regulations governing portfolio investments and transaction costs are low.
Adjustments to changes in relative returns are relatively rapid.  This implies that capital markets are
allocating funds more efficiently and are valuing securities more accurately and rapidly.  Studies confirm
that adjustments to a change in returns are rapid in countries with few regulations on portfolio allocation and
somewhat slower in countries with higher transaction costs, more restrictions and poorer information
disclosure [18].  Also, adjustments by households and non-financial companies tend to be slower due to
higher transaction costs and poorer information [19].
47. Analysts have also argued that the increased supply of long-term capital market instruments,
attributed mainly to the growth of pension funds and increased comfort with securities investing by
individuals, may be leading to a compression of the yield differential between equities and bonds.  It has
been suggested that this may have a structural impact on the capital market by making the issuance of
equities cheaper relative to bonds [20].
48. The process of financial innovation has been driven strongly by the growth of the institutional
sector.  Sophisticated trading arrangements and investment techniques have been developed in response to
the needs of institutional investors.  The growing importance of institutional investors is generating also an
increasing demand for risk-transfer techniques, which enable the investor to choose the desired combinations
of return and risk.  Such techniques include both securitisation, which enables the investor to transfer the
credit risk as well as the market risk, and derivatives, whereby market or price risk is reallocated among
participants.  A more recent development is credit derivatives, which enable market participants to transfer
credit risk separately [21].
49. The demand for risk-transfer techniques has been strongly driven by the nature of the liabilities of
the different types of institutional investors and regulatory requirements.  For example, defined-benefit
schemes and strict minimum-funding requirements have stimulated demand for hedging by pension funds.  In
order to minimise the costs of hedging, pension funds and life-insurance companies have an incentive to
immunise their defined-benefit liabilities via an investment strategy of duration matching.
50. The requirement of a fixed duration for investment instruments has stimulated innovations such as
zero coupon bonds, collateralised mortgage obligations, strips in government securities markets and
guaranteed income contracts; immunisation strategies have also stimulated the development of markets for
index options and futures.  Fixed-duration instruments have also spurred the process of securitisation of
mortgages in the case of collateralised mortgage obligations and of loans and private placements in the case
of GICs (Guaranteed Income Contracts).
4. Obstacles in developing an institutional sector in emerging market economies
51. It was argued in the previous section that there is considerable scope for promoting the growth of
the domestic institutional sector.  However, there are a number of major obstacles that are obstructing or
delaying the development of a domestic institutional investor base in emerging markets.
52. Central to the development of an institutional sector is the legal base for institutional investor
activities, including beneficial ownership, novation and trusts.  The second key requirement is the adoption
of investment management legislation that fosters confidence.  This legislation should cover information
about investment objectives and risk profiles, definition of prudential and fiduciary standards, regulation of
self-dealing, fair valuation procedures, protection of the integrity of the fund’s assets.
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53. Unfortunately, these two key building blocks of a domestic institutional sector are missing or only
partially in place in most emerging markets.  Against this backdrop, we shall briefly review a number of
specific obstacles for each category of institutional investor.
Mutual funds
54. Increased competition between and among banks and other financial institutions in the OECD area
has encouraged banks to move en masse into the mutual fund industry.  In contrast, the structure of the
banking industry in most emerging markets has hampered the growth of mutual funds.  Lack of competition
has led to situations where banks redirected fund investors into deposits.  Custodial arrangements tend to be
costly, with only a few institutions, mainly banks, being allowed to act as custodians.  A major barrier to the
development of mutual funds is the design and prudential regulation of private pension funds.
31 In many
OECD countries, mutual funds play an increasingly important role in managing pension fund assets.
However, in many emerging markets mutual funds are excluded from the pension fund business.
Life insurance companies
55. Emerging markets play a very small role in the life insurance business.  In 1993, the world market
share
32 of developing countries in the life insurance business stood at nearly 7 per cent, of which around 5
per cent Asian countries and Latin America less than 1 per cent.  The growth of the insurance industry has
been highest in East Asian countries, while the Latin American insurance sector has been expanding at a
very low pace [see Table 5].
Table 5.  Insurance Premium Development in Selected Regions, 1971-1990
(Average annual real growth














a) 1985 prices and exchange rates.
Source:  Schweizerische Rückversicherungs-Gesellschaft (1992).
56. Among emerging markets, South Korea and South Africa have the highest ratio of life insurance
premium income to gross domestic product.  The most rapid growth took place in Chile, South Korea and
Taiwan, followed by Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia.  Significant determinants of the expansion of the
insurance industry are real income growth and level of development.
33 Table 6 provides prima facie evidence
of the proposition that the level of development (and therefore, personal disposable income) is a major
determinant of life insurance development.  However, there are also policy-induced obstacles such as weak
competition and limited product innovation.  The growth of the life-insurance sector has also been hampered
by an inadequate sectoral infrastructure, including inadequate financial disclosure on the performance and
solvency of insurance companies.  Very strict portfolio investment rules have resulted in a “debt bias” with
most assets in the form of domestic government securities.21
Table 6.  Life Insurance Diffusion
a in Selected Emerging Economies;
 1987 and 1994
Country 1987 1994
South Africa 8.26 10.32
















United Kingdom 5.25 7.31
Switzerland 4.45 5.99
United States 3.69 3.63
Germany 2.83 2.80
Source:  Sigma (various) and B. Fischer (1997).
a)  Share of life insurance premium income to gross domestic product.
Pension funds
57. Pension funds are underdeveloped in emerging markets.
34  Important obstacles are the design and
prudential regulation of private pension funds.  In many countries, existing financial intermediaries are
excluded from the management of retirement assets.  Instead, pension funds must be new and specially
licensed to manage mandated retirement funds and guarantee a certain return.  In Latin America, minimum
profitability guarantees are defined in relative terms.  The return guarantee and regulation of fee structures
tend to promote herding behaviour of pension funds (resulting in very similar portfolios), to limit competition
among pension asset managers, and to lead to very high operational costs (marketing and fees).  The
introduction of greater competition is needed.  First, by allowing other financial intermediaries (including
mutual funds) to compete for the management of retirement savings.  Second, by offering greater freedom to
savers to choose among different portfolios of approved products.  Third, by relaxing portfolio investment
restrictions, including the freedom to invest in foreign securities.  Minimum profitability guarantees and
minimum capital rules (they can be used to restrict market access, thereby limiting competition in the
pension fund management business
35 ) may also need to be reviewed.  Pension regulators in Latin America
are already taking action I the areas of cost control and fee deregulation (see footnote 35).
58. Regulation of pension funds in transition countries varies greatly from  country to country (Table
7).22
Table 7.  Pension funds legislation























Czech Republic CZK 20m Unlimited TTT
2 Full no fee free free free free
Hungary HUF 20m
3 Unlimited EEE Full with fee 10 30 60 30
Lithuania TBA TBA EET Full no fee TBA TBA TBA TBA
Poland TBA TBA EET Full no fee 10 30 30 10
Russia n.a. n.a. TTT Full no fee TBA TBA TBA TBA
Slovak Republic SKK 30m n.a. EET Full no fee free free na 20
1.  “T”:  taxed; “E”: exempt.  First position refers to contributions, second to investment income and third to benefits.
2.  State subsidy for contributions instead of exemption.  3.  The minimum capital requirement of HUF 20 million is
required for funds established as legal entities separate from the sponsor.
Source:  EBRD 1996, Pension funds regulation.
59. In many transition economies, pension funds have to invest a minimum part of their assets in
government securities.  However, asset allocation rules differ significantly across countries.  For example,
Hungary and Poland have (different) quantitative limits on investments in equity, while the Czech Republic
employs a “prudent man rule”.  Also tax regimes vary a great deal.  For example, in Hungary strong
incentives exist to stimulate the growth of funded systems, while in the Czech Republic pension
contributions, pension investment income and pension benefits are taxed (see Table 7).
60. Transition countries, like other emerging markets, have obstacles to the development of funded
pension schemes in the form of institutional weaknesses such as the shortage of a domestic asset
management industry and other inadequacies in the financial market infrastructure,
36 lack of experienced
regulators, and insufficient competition among financial intermediaries that can offer investment
management services.  In addition, there is only a very narrow range of long-term and liquid savings
vehicles, while asset prices (equity, real estate) are very volatile.  A final institutional obstacle in developing
a funded pension systems in most emerging markets is the excessive size of the pay-as-you-go public pension
system.  Downsizing of the public pension system and rationalisation of benefits are not only needed on
fiscal policy grounds but also to leave greater freedom for the creation and growth (and thus competition) of
private pension funds.
61. Although emerging market economies face similar challenges in developing a funded pension
sector, there are also key differences.  Demographic and pension system dependency ratio differ
significantly.
37




































South Asia 1 260 55.2 15.1 11.2 7.0 3.4 1.4 1.8
East Asia 3 210 55.7 15.5 11.6 3.4 2.8 2.2 2.3
Eastern Europe,
Baltics and CIS 5 210 60.0 30.0 48.3 12.3 4.8 5.2 8.4
Latin America 5 360 60.8 14.9 21.0 3.4 4.2 2.4 2.0
OECD Countries 19 000 64.4 32.9 39.2 16.3 4.9 5.9 9.2
1.  Weighted averages except for the system dependency ration of Asia; Latin America and OECD.
Source:  EBRD 1996, Fox 1993, Sachs 1996, The world Bank 1994, IMF, OECD, Local Authorities.
62. In fact, the demographic structure of transition countries is very similar to OECD countries.
Average pension expenditure (as a per cent of GDP) in transition economies is very close to the OECD
average.  Projections of demographic and system dependency ratios for a number of transition countries
indicate that already large implicit government debt liabilities (given existing entitlement and contribution
rates) will continue to grow.
38  Fiscal positions and/or tax systems are generally weaker than in OECD
countries.  This makes pension reform in transition countries even more urgent than in the OECD area.
5. Financial Market Infrastructure and Institutional Sector
63. A well-functioning institutional sector requires a stable and efficient financial market
infrastructure.  The financial infrastructure consists of:  the legal framework; the financial accounting
system; the regulatory and supervisory framework; clearing and settlement systems; and the micro-structure
for trading securities.
64. The role of public policy in supporting the infrastructure of the financial system is fundamental.  It
includes establishing and enforcing property rights and other laws affecting contracts as well as regulating
financial markets and intermediaries.  An important challenge for financial policy-makers is how to respond
to financial product and financial infrastructure innovations.  Government regulatory actions can do much to
either mitigate or aggravate the dysfunctional aspects of financial innovations.  For example, the government
can promote adequate disclosure standards for OTC derivatives by demanding changes in the financial
accounting system.  Another important example is the role of regulators or supervisors in setting standards
for risk management by institutional investors.
65. These public policy responses to financial innovations are likely to enhance financial stability
without hampering the entrepreneurial activities of financial market participants.  Likewise, the focus in this
section is on the role of public policy in the development of an adequate infrastructure for the promotion of a
dynamic institutional sector.  The (expected) growth of the institutional sector is having a growing influence
on the structure and  modus operandi of financial markets and institutions.  The design of the proper
financial infrastructure to accommodate these structural changes and prospects is, therefore, a key policy
issue
39  In discussing the role of public policy in developing and promoting this infrastructure, we shall take
a closer look at the regulation and supervision of the institutional sector (including the broader legal
framework and accounting system) and the financial market micro-structure (including clearing and
settlement systems and the organisation and mechanics of trading).24
Regulation and supervision
66. Institutional investors are increasingly dominating the evolution of capital markets and corporate
finance.  At the same time, a dynamic institutional sector needs well-developed securities markets for the
efficient execution of their investment strategies.  Three functions of the regulatory framework are critical
for well-functioning capital markets.
67. The first function is to ensure an accurate disclosure of all material information.  Transparency in
the market by mandatory public disclosure is an important requirement for institutional investors.  Hence,
institutional investors shun capital markets with weak disclosure.  Differences in disclosure requirements
among countries are significant, partly due to different legal systems.  In emerging markets, the ability of
regulators to monitor and enforce disclosure may be weaker than in more mature markets.  For this reason, it
seems sensible to be quite specific on disclosure and reporting requirements.
68. The international community has been working on the harmonisation of disclosure requirements.
Both IOSCO and COSRA have published standards for full and fair disclosure.  Accounting standards are
key because disclosure will be effective only if the financial information provided by the company is based
on solid accounting principles and practices.  Common accounting standards are essential for institutional
investors to be able to assess accurately the “value” of investments.  In parallel, auditing standards and
practices also need to be high enough to ensure the reliability of disclosed information.
69. The second critical function of the regulatory framework necessary to develop confidence among
institutional investors is to adopt insider trading legislation.  Emerging markets should not try to eliminate
insider trading by relying solely on criminal prosecution.  It is more effective to have the full range of
sanctions (civil, administrative and criminal).
40
70. A third function of the regulatory system is to ensure fair treatment of all shareholders, including
minority shareholders, and the establishment of effective corporate governance mechanisms for shareholder
approval of key corporate decisions.  Different legal systems or traditions influence the extent to which
investors are protected.  Legal protections for shareholders and creditors are strongest in the English
common law countries and weakest in legal systems based on France’s Napoleonic Code.  (France, Italy,
Spain and most of Latin America).  In between are countries with laws based on the German model
(Germany, Japan, Korea and a handful of others) and the Scandinavian countries, which have their own
legal tradition.
41
71. Laws and regulations are one main component of an effective regulatory framework.  The other
component is enforcement by both official regulators and self-regulation.  There are several obstacles in
implementing OECD-style market-based regulatory models, based on disclosure and self-regulation, in
emerging markets.  Self-regulation and disclosure may, therefore, be problematic.  The alternative is to rely
more on excessive or draconian regulations by government agencies.  However, this may hamper the
development of both the capital market and the institutional sector.  These considerations indicate that it is
not easy for the authorities to strike the right balance.  One regulatory “philosophy” is to impose a draconian
regulatory regime in countries with a low degree of capital market development and to allow a gradual
relaxation of “draconian” rules as the financial and institutional sectors develop.  For example, draconian
regulations have been justified in emerging markets with underdeveloped capital markets and where private
pensions play a major role in the provision of retirement income.
42
72. Most emerging markets have made considerable progress in the development of a solid regulatory
and supervisory framework, although progress has been uneven.
43  Nonetheless, important weaknesses25
remain.  Many emerging markets have not established the legal and regulatory basis for dealing with
compensation funds, take-overs, and insider trading.  In addition, many emerging markets have not yet
established the legal and regulatory basis for dealing with institutional investors.  The general picture among
emerging markets in the three regions is as follows:
44 in Asian countries there is the common problem of
excessive regulations that inhibit capital market developments; in Latin America under-regulation or the lack
of effective enforcement constitutes obstacles for the creation of confidence in financial systems; Eastern
Europe and the Former Soviet Union need to make further progress in establishing the basic legal and
regulatory framework for capital market development.
Financial market micro-structure
73. The financial market micro-structure has changed significantly in the OECD area as a result of the
dramatic expansion of the OECD institutional sector and its impact on:  i) capital market liquidity, ii)
demand for capital market instruments and financial innovations, as well as iii) the growing influence of the
asset management industry on investment strategies and techniques and trading arrangements.  Similar
structural changes in the financial market infrastructure will (or need to) take place in emerging markets
when the domestic institutional investor base continues to expand.  In fact, there is a two-way dynamic
process whereby a dynamic institutional sector encourages the development of a modern capital market
infrastructure, while at the same time the expansion of a market-oriented institutional investor base requires
the existence of a sophisticated financial infrastructure.
The growing influence of asset management
74. Professional fund or asset managers are an integral part of the financial market infrastructure.
They have a growing influence on the structure and modus operandi of financial market institutions.  The
technical and operational demands, in conjunction with growing size, of the asset management industry has
had, and is having, a major influence on how institutional investors are operating.
75. In its most simple form, fund or asset management can be seen as a service involving management
of the investment portfolio on behalf of institutional investors.  Asset management can be carried out
internally or externally.  Delegation to an external fund management service - e.g. a bank, insurance
company, mutual fund or other independent money management company - raises principal-agent
problems.
45  The asset management profession is an important driving force behind the growing
sophistication of investment strategies of institutional investors as well as innovations in securities trading
arrangements and investment techniques.
The impact of the institutional sector on trading arrangements and investment techniques
76. First, sophisticated trading techniques, such as portfolio insurance, place heavy demands on the
liquidity in the securities markets.  Institutional investors have encouraged innovations in financial products
and investment techniques to provide deposit-like characteristics to their liabilities.  Institutional investors
are able to offer bank - like deposits by following sometimes complicated strategies of holding and trading
appropriate combination of assets, even when their asset composition is not itself substantially liquid.  To
the extent that such strategies can be carried out with transactions that are as low as bank operating costs,
institutional investors apparently can provide perfect substitutes for bank deposits.26
77. If these techniques to bestow deposit-like characteristics to illiquid securities, which include
derivatives, could create liquidity in securities markets without generating additional demands for bank credit
lines, bank business would decline sharply.  However, access to liquidity through the banking system is vital
to the delivery of cash associated with the execution of the above mentioned sophisticated trading techniques.
This is an important reason why a sound banking system is a sine qua non for the functioning of liquid
capital markets with a dynamic institutional sector [28].
78. Second, with the increase in trading by institutional investors, trading arrangements more suitable
to these investors had to be developed.  This has resulted in the evolution of special arrangements for the
execution of certain types of orders commonly sought by institutional investors:  (i) orders requiring the
execution of a trade of a large number of shares of a given stock (block trades), and (ii) orders requiring the
execution of a large number of different stocks at as near the same time as possible (programme trades).
79. The operational arrangement that has evolved to accommodate these two types of institutional
trades is the development of a network of trading desks of the major securities firms and institutional
investors that communicate with each other by means of electronic display systems and telephones.  This
network is called the “upstairs market.”  This market plays an essential role in the well-functioning of capital
markets by (a) providing liquidity to the market so that such institutional trades can be executed smoothly,
and (b) by arbitraging activities that help to integrate fragmented stock markets, thereby further boosting
liquidity.
80. Institutional investors’ needs are also a driving force behind a switch from market maker systems
with screen-based displays of quotes with all trading conducted over the telephone, to electronic order book
systems which can automatically execute orders entered by or via exchange members. For example, the
London Stock Exchange is planning to introduce an order book trading system for FT-SE 100 stocks, partly
in response to institutional investors’ demands.
81. Changes in the micro-structure of financial markets to improve the one or more dimensions of
market liquidity have lowered indirect trading costs.  The search for more efficient ways of trading is also
fostering the growth of alternative or non-traditional trading systems -- in particular proprietary trading
systems (PTSs).  This has resulted in the bypassing of brokers by institutional investors from securities
transactions (disintermediation) and pressure on transaction fees, thereby lowering direct transaction costs
82. Third, in practice, active asset management often lowers returns when transaction costs are taken
into account.  This is consistent with the so-called efficient markets hypothesis, that states that current
securities prices incorporate all available information.  Consequently, no net benefit can be expected from
spending extra resources on active investment strategies in order to try to beat the "market index".  Thus,
portfolio indexing can be the optimal investment strategy in situations where securities markets are
price-efficient.  The amount of institutional funds managed using an indexing strategy has grown
substantially.  In particular the use of benchmarks tailored to individual pension funds’ liabilities has
increased.  For example, the use of individual benchmarks for UK pension funds has grown from less than 5
per cent in 1990 to more than 30 per cent of the total in 1996.  Typically, the benchmarks consist of
guidelines for the proportions of a pension fund the manager can invest in particular asset classes.  Yet,
despite the growing body of evidence that fund managers are unable to outperform systematically the stock
market, indexed funds still account for a relatively small part of total institutional stock investments.27
Assessment of progress in emerging markets
83. A modern financial market micro-structure is an essential part of the development of a domestic
institutional sector in emerging markets.  As indicated earlier, there is a two-way dynamic process.  This
means that the implementation of policies that promote a domestic institutional investor base - e.g. via
pension reform  or via the elimination of other obstacles
46 - will stimulate the development of the capital
market.  Nonetheless, financial policies that promote the development of a modern financial market micro-
structure, are a key part of building a market-oriented domestic institutional investor base.  Although
progress has been made,
47 the policy agenda remains full.
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Table 9.  Capital Market Development in Emerging Markets, 1995













Argentina 4.0 8.7 8.2 6.2
Brazil 5.6 9.1 7.5 6.9
Chile 8.4 10.0 6.6 8.3
China 4.1 7.6 3.9 5.0
India 6.1 3.8 5.2 5.3
Indonesia 5.9 8.1 7.5 6.9
Korea 6.7 8.7 7.7 7.5
Malaysia 8.7 8.6 9.0 8.7
Mexico 6.4 8.4 8.8 7.5
Pakistan 4.3 1.0 7.8 4.1
Philippines 8.5 6.3 6.2 7.4
Poland 4.7 7.5 7.3 6.1
Sri Lanka 2.9 7.0 8.2 5.3
Thailand 8.6 8.7 7.1 8.3
Turkey 4.8 9.3 8.0 6.7
Note:  The index ranges from 1 to 10 with higher numbers representing a higher level of marker development.  See
World Bank 1997, Private Capital  Flows to  Developing Countries, Oxford University Press.
a)  Based on a weighted average of market characteristics, including market capitalisation, volatility, market
concentration, and level of activity, relative to an industrial country benchmark.
b)  Based on measures of efficiency in settlement and postsettlement actions.
c)  Based on measures of the quality of financial reporting, protection of investor rights, and market openness.
Source:  IFC, Emerging Market Factbook 1996; Global Securities Consulting Service, Review of Emerging Markets
and Review of Major Markets.
6. Policy conclusions
84. A dynamic community of institutional investors is a pre-condition for the development of liquid
securities market with sophisticated financial vehicles.  There is a dynamic two-way process whereby the
growth of a domestic institutional investor base encourages the development of a modern capital market,
while the expansion of the institutional sector requires the existence of a sophisticated financial market
infrastructure.
85. The paper discusses the main factors driving the growth of the institutional sector in the OECD
area:  financial deregulation, liberalisation of the activities of institutional investors, ageing populations and
pension reform, technological advances, expansion of the asset management industry.  It is concluded that in
view of the OECD experience, the potential for the expansion of a domestic institutional investor base is
enormous.29
86. Policymakers in emerging market economies need to follow a two-pronged approach:  (i) the
elimination of policy-induced or structural obstacles to the development of a domestic institutional investor
base; (ii) preparing capital markets for a strong institutional investor community.
87. The paper identified major obstacles in developing a domestic institution sector, including an
inadequate legal base and improper (or the absence of) legislation for asset or money management.  More
specific obstacles for each category of institutional investor have also been discussed:
- mutual funds (lack of competition; exclusion of mutual funds from the management of pension
fund assets);
- insurance companies (overregulation; limited product innovation; inadequate disclosure of
financial information on the solvency and financial performance of insurance companies; failure to
establish an effective system of consumer and investor protection; excessive portfolio investment
restrictions);
- pension funds (excessive size of public PAYG system; lack of legal framework for private
pension funds; absence of professional asset management industry; excessive portfolio investment
restrictions; too restrictive licensing policy, leading to cartelisation of the pension fund business;
lack of freedom to savers to choose among different portfolios of approved retirement products;
high and/or fixed fees of private pension funds).
88. The combination of the “natural” growth potential of the institutional sector (e.g., through a rise in
living standards, the import of modern financial technology, etc.) and the removal of policy-induced
obstacles would allow a major expansion of the activities of domestic institutional investors in emerging
markets.  Modernising the financial market infrastructure would give an additional push to this development.
89. Urgent action is needed in the following areas:
1.  the regulatory framework (stricter financial disclosure standards and improved accounting
rules; more effective enforcement of these standards and rules; implementation of insider
trading rules and investor protection provisions; the “right balance between statutory
regulations and self-regulatory arrangements, taking into account the capabilities of SROs and
potential conflicts of interest);
2.  the legal system and property rights (fair treatment of all shareholders; better accountability
of management to shareholders; independent securities registries of ownership records in order
to avoid manipulations or outright fraud by management and/or other insiders);
3.  the financial market infrastructure (development of asset management industry; introduction
of modern trading arrangements and sophisticated investment techniques; reliable and efficient
clearance and settlement systems, including a well-functioning central depository; efficient and
strong large-value interbank payment systems, including a robust and reliable operational
infrastructure; a sound banking system).30
ANNEX I: REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF OECD INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS [1]-
[4]
Insurance Companies
90. Insurance companies are financial intermediaries that undertake to make payments if a certain
event occurs.  Their principal activity is to bear and manage risk for a price (i.e., the insurance premium).
Insurance activities provide protection against the future consequences of:  (i) uncertain events that may or
may not occur; (ii) certain, inevitable events whose date of occurrence is unknown.  There are two basic
types of insurance activities:  life insurance activities and non-life (property and casualty) insurance
activities.
91. The tax and regulatory aspects of insurance activities differ across OECD countries and even
within individual countries (e.g. in the USA rules and regulations may vary from State to State).
Harmonisation of a number of regulations has taken place within the European Union in the form of EU
Directives.
Tax and regulatory aspects of life insurance activities
92. All OECD countries provide some tax concessions for the purchase, maintenance or execution of
life insurance policies [5].  In most countries, tax relief is provided for premiums paid.  Policies that are
primarily survivorship contracts (e.g., endowments and annuities) are more likely to enjoy tax preferences.
93. The regulatory regime concerning investments of technical provisions is another determinant that
influences life insurance investment activities.  Each OECD country has regulations with respect to (i) the
types of securities that are eligible for investment, and (ii) the valuation of these securities for regulatory
purposes.  All OECD countries, and in the United States, the individual states, have approved lists of
investments which insurance companies are allowed to hold.  The rationale of these lists is to ensure that
eligible investments possess acceptable levels of investment risk.  Most OECD countries impose maximum
limits on classes of investment:  quoted and unquoted domestic shares, foreign securities, real estate,
mortgage loans and other loans [Table A2].  The general purpose of these maximum levels is to restrict the
default and liquidity risks of investments.  Maxima are also applied to ensure that there is sufficient portfolio
diversification of investment holdings.  Although regulatory investment maxima vary widely across OECD
countries, the actual investment portfolios of insurance companies do not appear very much constrained by
these maxima.  Apparently, in many instances the limits that have been set by the regulatory authorities have
been higher than what most insurance companies would themselves view as prudent levels [6].
94. Another important area of investment regulation concerns the matching of assets and liabilities in
terms of maturity and currency.  Only 5 OECD countries (Greece, Mexico, Norway, Sweden and Ireland)
have statutory requirement for maturity or duration matching.  However, in most OECD countries the
regulatory authorities review on an informal basis the time profiles of assets and liabilities as part of the31
wider assessment of the solvency of an insurance company.  A serious mismatch of assets and liabilities
would endanger the solvency of life insurance companies which tend to have longer-term liabilities with often
implicit interest guarantees.  Life insurance companies need therefore to ensure that the duration of their
investments are broadly in line with their mainly long-term liabilities, in order to minimise the inherent
interest rate risk.  One of the main investment risks for a life insurance company is that with many
short-term assets it would face a reinvestment risk in market situations with lower interest rates than
warranted by the (often implicit) interest guarantees on its long-term liabilities.  Moreover, for life contracts
with a significant savings component, legal requirements and/or competitive pressures demand that the rates
of returns on investment holdings maintain their value in real terms.
95. In nearly all OECD countries there are statutory requirements for some degree of currency
matching.  Currency matching requirements are separate from restrictions on foreign investments
[Table A3].  The latter are based on default and liquidity risk considerations.
96. In all OECD countries insurance companies are free to use derivatives in connection with the
investment of their capital funds.  However, a number of countries restrict their use in the investment of
technical (mathematical) reserves [Table A4].  In almost all OECD countries the use of derivatives is
restricted to risk management purposes. In many countries the writing of options is only allowed when they
are covered.
Regulatory treatment of the non-life insurance business
97. Competitive pressures have made the need for price regulation less desirable than in the past.
Regulation of prices could even backfire when imposed prices lead to the withdrawal of insurers offering
insurance.  Regulations governing eligible investments have been imposed to reduce the likelihood of
insolvency.  In most OECD countries, the same maximum percentages in investment classes apply for
non-life and life companies.  Differences between life insurance and non-life insurance can be found in
Canada, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Portugal, and some states (e.g., Delaware and New Jersey) for the United
States [Table A2].  In view of the different nature of investment risks in the two sectors, this degree of
uniformity is surprising.  Practical problems regarding the enforceability of these rules seem to be the main
reason why there are no bigger differences [8].32
98. For non-life  companies maturity matching is relatively unimportant, because the duration of
technical provisions is shorter than those of life companies and there are no interest guarantees.  On the other
hand, currency matching is even of greater importance for non-life companies since there is uncertainty
about the timing of claim payments.33
Table A2:  Maximum percentage that can be invested in a given class of Investments
Domestic shares Domestic shares Foreign shares Foreign bonds
and




Non-life Life Non-life Life Non-life Life Non-life Life Non-life Life Non-life Life Non-life Life
Australia - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Austria 30a 30e 5 5 30a 30e - - 30a 30e - - 0 0
Belgium - - 10a 10e 10a(2) 10e(2) 10(3) 10(3) 10(4) 10(4) - - 5(5) 5(5)
Canada 25a 5-25e 25a 5-25e 0 5-25e 0 10 5-25e - - 5 5
Denmark 40a 40e 10 10 40a,d 40d,e - - - - - - 10 10
Finland 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - - -
France 65a 65e 65a 65e 65a 65e - - 40 40 10b 10f 10b 10f
Germany 30 30 10 10 6 6 5 5 25 25 50a 50e 50a 50e
Greece 30a 30e 30a 30e 30a 30e - - 40 50 10b 10f 10b 10f
Iceland 40a 40e 10b 10f 40a 40e 10b 10f - - - - 10b 10f
Ireland 50-60a 55e 20 2.5 50-60a 55e - - 60 25 15-30b 10 15-30b 45
Italy 20 20 20 20  10 20 30 50 35 50 20 50 0 0
Japan 30a 30e 30a 30e 30b 30f 30b 30f 20 20 55c - 55c 10
Luxembourg 10 10 5 5 5 5 10 10 40 40 10a 10e 0 0
Mexico 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 40 40 40 40 40 40
Netherlands - - 10 10 - - - - - - 10 10 5j 8j
Norway 20a 20e 20a 20e 20a 20e 30b 30f 30b 30f 30b 30f 30b 30f
Portugal 25a 25e 10 10 25a 25e 60 60 35 45 10 25 10 25
Spain - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Sweden 25a 25e 25a 25e 25a 25e - - 25b 25f 25b 25e 10 10
Switzerland 30a 30e 30a 30e 25b 25f 20b 20f - - - - 0 0
Turkey - - 10 10 - - - - 20 20 20 20 20 20
UK - - 10a 10e - - - - - - 10a 10e 10a 10e
USA(New Jersey) - 15e - 15e h i h i 5 10 40 60 - -
USA (Delaware) 40a (1) 40a (1) 5 5 5 5 25 25 50 50 - -
a) maximum for these classes of investment combined (Non-life) 1. 250 per cent (at market value) of the capital and surplus
b) maximum for these classes of investment combined (Non-life) 2. unquoted shares only
c) maximum for these classes of investment combined (Non-life) 3. only State and enterprises bonds outside of area A (see the
Directive 89/647/EEC)
d) if unquoted then ten per cent 4. investments in a single real estate or in several real estate
close to one another
e) maximum for these classes of investment combined (Life)which
would constitute one single investment
5. five per cent with a maximum of one per cent for one single
loan
f) maximum for these classes of investment combined (Life)
g) maximum for these classes of investment combined (Life); only for
unqualified non-mortgage loans
h) investment must not exceed the value of outstanding policies in the
foreign country
i) five per cent in the aggregate; two per cent in foreign countries,
except for "qualified foreign investment" defined in the statute
j) unsecured loans.
Note:  maxima in respect of foreign investments are separate from the currency
matching requirements for foreign liabilities
Source:  OECD Policy Issues in Insurance, Paris 1996, OECD submissions.34
























Australia - - n/a n/a n/a n/a
Austria 80 80 Yes n/a 100 100
Belgium 80 80 Yes n/a 100 100
Canada 100 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Denmark 80 80 Yes Yes 50 50
Finland 100 95 n/a n/a n/a n/a
France 80 80 Yes Yes 0 0
Germany 80 80 Yes n/a 50 50
Greece 80 80 n/a n/a 100 100
Iceland 80 80 Yes Yes 50 50
Ireland 80 80 Yes n/a 50 50
Italy 80 80 Yes n/a 100 100
Japan No No No No n/a No
Luxembour
g
80 80 n/a n/a 0 0
Mexico - - - - n/a n/a
Netherland
s
80 80 Yes - 100 100
Norway 80 80 Yes Yes 80 80
Portugal 80 80 Yes Yes 50 50
Spain 80 80 Yes n/a - -
Sweden 80 80 n/a n/a 0 0
Switzerlan
d
80 80 n/a n/a 80 80
Turkey 100 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
UK 80 80 No n/a 0 0
USA(New
Jersey)
100 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
USA
(Delaware)
100 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Source: Table A235
Table A4:  Use of financial derivatives
Can they be used Can they be used Purpose for which
in respect of the in respect of the they can be used
investment of technical investment of
provisions? capital funds?
Non-life Life Non-life Life Non-life Life
Australia Yes Yes Yes Yes Hedging* Hedging*
Austria Yes Yes Yes Yes Hedging* Hedging*
Belgium Yes Yes Yes Yes Hedging* Hedging*
Canada Yes Yes Yes Yes Hedging* Hedging*
Denmark Yes Yes Yes Yes Hedging* Hedging*
Finland Yes Yes Yes Yes Hedging* Hedging*
France No No Yes Yes Hedging* Hedging*
Germany Yes Yes Yes Yes Hedging* Hedging*
Greece - - - -
Iceland Yes Yes Yes Yes Hedging Hedging
Ireland Yes Yes Yes Yes Hedging Hedging*
Italy Yes Yes Yes Yes Hedging Hedging
Japan Yes Yes Yes Yes Hedging* Hedging*
Luxembourg Yes Yes Yes Yes Hedging* Hedging*
Mexico No No Yes Yes Hedging Hedging
Netherlands Yes Yes Yes Yes Hedging* Hedging*
Norway Yes Yes Yes Yes Hedging* Hedging*
Portugal Yes Yes Yes Yes Hedging Hedging
Spain No No Yes Yes Hedging Hedging
Sweden Yes Yes Yes Yes Hedging* Hedging*
Switzerland No No Yes Yes Hedging* Hedging*
Turkey Yes Yes Yes Yes Hedging Hedging
UK Yes Yes Yes Yes Hedging* Hedging*
USA(New Jersey) Yes Yes Yes Yes Hedging* Hedging*
USA (Delaware) Yes Yes Yes Yes Hedging* Hedging*
* Also allowed to write covered call options
Source: Table A236
Pension Funds
99. In all OECD countries pension funds have become major institutional investors and important
players in the capital markets due to the following factors:
  -  income and wealth have grown steadily since World War II, providing households with more
funds for long-term savings;
  -  people are living longer and have larger financial needs during longer retirement periods;
  -  pension claims are tax free until after workers retire and income from employment ceases.
100. Pension fund schemes can be classified into the following three categories [Table B1]:
i.  Public managed pension schemes with defined benefits and pay-as-you-go finance, usually based
on a payroll tax.  They are mandatory for covered workers.  In most OECD countries coverage is
(near) universal.
ii. Occupational pension funds that are privately managed and offered by employers to employees.
Thanks to tax advantages not available to personal pension plans, coverage grew in most OECD
countries.  Currently more than one-third of the working age population (or more than 40 per cent
of the labour force) is covered in OECD countries.  Within this category of funds there is a trend in
OECD countries from defined benefit and partially funded schemes toward defined contribution
schemes.
iii. Personal pension plans in the form of saving and annuity schemes.  These schemes are normally
voluntary and based on fully funded defined contribution plans.  In some non-OECD countries
(e.g., Singapore and Malaysia) there exist publicly managed, mandatory schemes that are fully
funded and based on defined contributions, known as provident funds.  Tax incentives encourage
the development of these plans, although at present their share of total income in old age is
relatively small.
101. An overview of the structure of pension provisions in a sample of OECD countries is given in
[Tables B2 and B3].
Tax treatment of pension schemes
102. Unlike other types of institutional investors, pension funds in most OECD countries benefit from
tax deferral:  contributions and accumulated interest and capital gains are tax free;  tax is paid on receipt of
a pension after retirement.  Reasons for the favourable tax treatment of pension schemes include:  (i) the
argument that there is a need to encourage people to save enough to maintain post retirement living
standards; (ii) this in turn would mean that when people save enough it would reduce the cost to the state to
provide means-tested social security benefits; and (iii) it is also hoped that the general level of saving would
be raised.  The tax treatment of pension schemes differ widely across OECD countries [Tables B2-B3].37
Regulatory aspects of pension fund activities
103. Quantitative regulation of portfolio holdings are in place in a number of OECD countries.
Reasons include the protection of pension fund beneficiaries or benefit insurers and, in some countries, the
creation of a steady demand for government securities [11].  Limits are often imposed on holdings with
relatively volatile returns, such as equities, real estate and foreign assets, although their mean return might
be higher (e.g. on equity) than on assets with so-called stable returns (e.g. government bonds with a fixed
coupon).  There are often also limits on self investment, to protect against the associated concentration of
risk regarding insolvency of the plan sponsor.
104. A number of countries do not impose quantitative limits but impose guidelines such as the so-
called "prudent man rule".  Under the prudent man rule, fiduciaries, trustees, and bank trust departments are
expected to behave as careful professionals in making investment decisions.  In the United States the
Employment Retirement Security Act (ERISA) stipulates that the fiduciary must be knowledgeable enough
to act as a careful professional, experienced and educated in trust and financial matters.  "Prudence" is a
design standard, not a performance standard.  This is reflected in the two most significant elements of the
rule:  (i) the requirement to diversify; (ii) the exhortation to favour "seasoned" situations that
similarly-placed institutions find appropriate.  In the United States, the application of this design standard to
investment decisions has led to the overwhelming preponderance of pension equity money being invested in
the limited number of listed securities of American corporations with large capitalisation.  It may also
account for the increase in the "index mode" of investments.
105. Prudential concerns are also often mentioned as the rationale for regulatory constraints on portfolio
holdings of foreign securities [Table B9].  Other motives (for example, the "benchmark" orientation of fund
managers) are, however, also mentioned in the literature (see section 6.1).
106. Funding rules are a key aspect of the regulation of defined benefit pension funds.  A defined
contribution is by definition always funded.  However, with defined benefit schemes one needs to make a
distinction between the pension plan (i.e. the contractual rights of the parties) and the pension fund (i.e. the
pool of assets to provide cover for the promised benefits).  Under/over funding is the situation when the fund
is worth less/more than the present discounted value of the promised benefits.  Minimum funding rules seek
to protect the beneficiaries against default risk by the company.  Since unfunded benefits are liabilities for
the company, pensioners or pension insurers (see below) may have no better claim than other creditors.
Other regulatory issues concern ownership of surpluses, portability, internal transfers, fraud, disclosure, and
the structure and mechanics of supervision [see Tables B2-B3, for a summary].38
Table B2:  Summary of Pension Asset Regulations
Portfolio regulations Regulation of funding (1)
United Kingdom Prudent man concept; 5 per cent self
investment limit, concentration limit for
defined contribution plans.
Maximum 5 per cent overfund of PBO or
IBO.  Funding only obligatory for contracted
out part of social security.
Germany Guidelines:  maximum 30 per cent EU
equity, 25 percent EU property, 6 Per cent
non-EU shares, 6 per cent non-EU bonds, 20
per cent overall foreign assets, 10 per cent
self investment limit.
Funding obligatory up to PBO. Option of
book-reserve funding.
Netherlands Prudent man concept; 5 per cent self
investment limit, whereby free reserves can
be added up to a total limit of 10 per cent.
Minimum funding requirement is present
value of ABO discounted at 4 per cent;
percentage of overfunding dependent on
composition of investment portfolio and
volatility of relevant investment returns;
maximum 15 per cent overfund of ABO,
minimum is ABO itself.
Sweden Majority to be in listed bonds, debentures and
retroverse loans to contributors.
For ATO, IBO is funded.  Contribution rate
adjusted 5-yearly to balance fund.
Denmark Property loans, shares and investment trust
holdings limited to 40 per cent, foreign assets
to 20 per cent; 60 per cent to be in domestic
debt.  No self investment.
Irrelevant as defined contribution; benefits
must be funded externally.
France Assets of supplementary funds
(ARRCO/AGIRC) to be invested 50 per cent
in EU government bonds and less than 33 per
cent in loans to sponsors.  insured funds to be
at least 34 per cent state bonds, maximum 40
per cent property and 15 per cent Treasury
deposits.  No foreign assets.
Funded company schemes forbidden: book
reserve funding subject to tax discrimination.
Italy No pension law for self administered
schemes.  Most schemes are insured
investments may be in state bonds (maximum
90 per cent), bank deposits, property,
mortgages, securities, investment funds.
No pension law for self administered
schemes; draft law proposes payments equal
to 7 per sent of salary.  Insured plans must be
fully funded on a 15 year projection.
Ireland Schemes must diversify prudently, any self
investment to be declared.
Funding of ABO required; deferred rights
indexed.
Belgium 15 per cent to be invested in government
bonds, no more than 15 per cent in sponsor,
40 per cent limit on real estate, 10 per cent
deposits.
Funding obligatory of ABO based on current
salary, interest rate 7 per cent.
Spain 90 per cent in stocks, bonds, mortgages,
property, deposits.
Funding obligatory of ABO plus 4 per cent
margin; maximum interest rate 6 per cent.
Portugal 30 per cent to be invested in government
bonds, maxima of 50 per cent real estate, 15
per cent self investment, 40 per cent equities
and bonds not listed in Portugal.
Funding obligatory of ABO.
Norway Maximum 20 per cent in shares; maximum
30 per cent in loans that are not issued or
guaranteed by:  the government or
municipalities; financial institutions or EU
credit institutions; and investment in other
real estate than negotiable property.
Funds should, at least, cover the difference
between PBO and NPV of future
contributions, based on an interest rate of 3
per cent.
(1) ABO refers to the accrued benefit obligation; PBO the projected benefit obligation
Source: Davis (1995), EFRP, OECD.39





Largely defined benefit based
on final salary.
Primary cover largely defined




Largely defined benefit with





returns tax free.  Benefits
taxed, except tax free lump
sum.
Contributions and asset
returns tax free.  Benefits
taxed.
Employers’ contributions
taxed as wages; employee
contributions and asset
returns tax free.  Benefits
taxed at low rate.
Social Security Low replacement ratio.
Scheme members can
contract out of earnings
related social security.
Low replacement ratio. High replacement ratio.
Regulation of
portfolios
Prudent man concept; 5 per
cent self investment limit;
concentration limit for
defined contribution plans.
Prudent man concept; 10 per
cent limit on self investment
for defined benefit plans.
Guidelines; maximum 20 per
cent equity, 5 per cent
property, 4 per cent foreign;




Maximum 5 per cent
overfund of IBO or PBO.
Funding only obligatory for
contracted out part of social
security.
Maximum 50 per cent






up to PBO.  Option of
booking (tax exempt-
pensions taxed at normal
rate).




50 per cent (company
schemes) 20 per cent
(personal pensions).















Vesting in 2 years.
Indexation of accrued
benefits.  Transfers must be
made to other pension funds.
Vesting in 5 years. No
indexation of accrued
benefits.  Lump sum
distribution permitted on
transfer.
Vesting in 10 years.
Indexation of accrued
benefits.
Indexation Discretionary (to date) but
total or partial indexation
common in practice (75 per
cent).





Source:  Davis (1995) and OECD.40
Table B3:  Features of funded pension systems (continued)
Denmark Sweden (ATP) Switzerland
Nature of benefits for
average member
Largely defined contribution. Defined benefit based on
best income years.
Majority of schemes (60
per cent) defined
contribution but with
targets of 60 per cent
replacement rate which
contributions adjusted). 40




Fund may be taxed, including
40 per cent of lump sum.
Contributions tax free.
Tax on asset returns
(1991) benefits taxed at
low rate.
Contributions and asset
returns tax free, benefits
taxed.
Social security High replacement ratio. Low replacement ratio;
only for basic needs.
Low replacement
ratio; designed to be
supplemented by
mandatory private scheme.
Regulation of portfolios Real estate, investment trusts,
shares limited to 40 per cent.
60 per cent in domestic debt.
No self investment.  Only
“small
proportion” can be invested in
ternationally.




30 per cent limit on
domestic shares; 50 per
cent domestic real estate;
20 per cent
foreign currency assets; 25
per cent foreign shares;
overlaps are possible.
Regulation of funding Irrelevant as defined
contribution.
Contribution rate adjusted




Maturity of funds Mature. Mature
Coverage of workforce
(approx.)
30 per cent (company funds)
20 per cent (personal
pensions).
90 per cent (compulsory). Above a certain salary
level (SFr 23 280) 100 per
cent.
Insurance of benefits State backup as national
scheme.
Yes; Government Safety
Fund.  Small funds backed
by insurance companies.
Portability features Immediate access to own
contributions, 5 years total









Indexation No. Yes. Indexing not compulsory.
Source: Davis (1993) and OECD.41
Table B3:  Features of funded pension systems (continued)
Japan Canada Netherlands
Nature of benefits for
average member
Largely defined benefit
based on years of service
and career earning or final
basic salary.  Often taken
as a lump sum.
Largely defined benefit
based either on final salary
or flat rate benefit.
Almost exclusively
defined benefit, based for






Benefit taxed, except tax
free lump sum.
Contributions and asset
returns tax free.  Benefits
taxed.
Contributions and asset
returns tax free. Benefits
taxed.
Social security High replacement ratio.
Scheme members can
contract out of earnings
related social security.
Low replacement ratio. Low replacement ratio.
Regulation of portfolios Guidelines; maximum 30
per cent equity, 20 per cent
property, 30 per cent
foreign, 10 per cent one
company.  Minimum
50 per cent bonds.
Prudent man (since 1987);
tax on foreign assets above
10 per cent; 7 per cent limit
on real estate.
See Table B2
Regulation of funding Funding optional. Tax
exempt up to ABO only.
(Book reserves tax exempt
up to 40 per cent of
liabilities).
Funding obligatory.
Maximum 5 per cent
overfund of PBO.
See Table B2
Maturity of funds Immature. Mature. Mature.
Coverage of workforce
(approx.)
37 per cent (funded plans
only).
41 per cent. 90 per cent.




No (but social security
provides backup).
No
Portability features Vesting graded between 5
and 30 years for voluntary
leavers.  Low transfer
values for voluntary early
leavers.
Vesting after 2 years.  Little
indexation of accrued
benefits.





Indexation Rare except for part
replacing social security.
Provisions rare (6 per






Source:  Davis (1995) and OECD.42
Table B3:  Features of funded pension systems (continued)
Norway
Nature of benefits for average member Largely defined benefit based on final salary.
Most schemes aim to provide a benefit
which, together with the State scheme,
corresponds to 60-66 percent of the last
income earned after a contribution period of
30 years.
Taxation of funded schemes Contributions and asset returns tax free to a
certain extent for plans which comply with
the regulations of the tax law. Benefits taxed
as income.
Social security High replacement ratio for low income;
designed to be supplemented by mandatory
private scheme.
Regulations of portfolios See B2
Regulation of funding See B2
Maturity of funds
Coverage of workforce (approx.) Compulsory occupational pension in public
sector.  In the private sector, 1/3 of the
workforce have occupational pension
scheme and about 1/4 of the overall
workforce have a private pension scheme.
Insurance of benefits Yes, via insurance supervision.
Portability features Vesting in 3 years.
Indexation Indexation follows social security index,
which is set by the government each year.
Source:  OECD.43
Table B9:  Regulatory Constraints on Foreign Investment by Pension Funds











Belgium Location in Belgium Not applicable
Canada (a) 20% None
Japan 30% None
Portugal 40% (only EU) None





Denmark “Small proportion” stipulated 80%
60% minimum in domestic
debt




(a) Applies only to private pension funds.  France and Italy are not included, because private pension schemes are
almost nil.
(b) Overlaps are possible.
Source: OECD44
Investment Companies (Institutions for Collective Investment in Securities)
107. Investment companies are financial intermediaries that sell shares to the public and invest the
proceeds in a diversified portfolio of securities.  Each share sold represents a proportionate interest in the
portfolio of securities managed by the investment company on behalf of the companies' shareholders.  The
type of securities purchased depends on the company's investment strategy.
108. The different types of investment companies are based on a common principle:  individuals
contribute savings to a large pool -- the mutual fund --which is managed by a team of professional money
managers.  This mutual fund operation is conceptually different from asset management services offered by
securities brokers (e.g. “SIMs” in Italy), banks and trust companies to individual clients.
109. There are four distinct parties involved in any type of “mutual” fund operation:  (1) fund
participants who contribute their savings; (2) the fund management company that invests the pool of savings
and executes the necessary transactions within the framework of the rules specified in the mandate of a given
mutual fund and the existing regulatory and supervisory regime; (3) the depository bank that is empowered
to act as custodian for the assets of the fund, and is charged with ensuring that all transactions executed by
the management company conform to the fund’s regulations; and (4) the sales network that acts as a conduit
for contributions to the fund.  The network may consist of  the branches of the depository bank or other
banks, a distribution unit within the fund management company, a brokerage company or a combination.
110. By investing in a fund, an investor can effectively achieve the benefits of diversification at lower
cost even if the amount of money available is not very large.  Beyond risk reduction via diversification
offered by the funds, there are reduced costs of contracting and information processing.  In addition, money
market mutual funds generally also provide payment services by allowing investors to write checks drawn on
the fund, although this payment facility is limited in various ways.
The regulation of investment companies
111. Extensive regulation by governmental authorities is a characteristic of mutual fund activities in
many OECD countries.  A distinction needs to be made between the restrictions on the "manufacture" of
investment fund products and services and restrictions on their "distribution".  Although in many respects
(e.g. investor protection) investment companies are required to operate under the regulatory and supervisory
framework for securities markets, there are many special provisions that regulate their activities.
Regulations cover usually the following key areas: self dealings and affiliated party transactions;
management fees of professional fund managers; capital structures; investment objectives and policies;
protection of physical integrity of the asset pool; fair valuation of investor purchases and redemptions; and
the disclosure of reliable information to investors.
112. In the United States, all investment companies are regulated at the federal level according to the
Investment Company Act of 1940.  This Act established a comprehensive framework of federal regulation
for the protection of United States investors, including disclosure, accounting, pricing, the use of leverage,
transactions with affiliates, and the custody of fund assets.  The securities issued by investment companies
must be registered with the SEC.  The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988
requires mutual funds investment advisors to institute and enforce procedures that reduce the chances of
insider trading.  The purchases and sales of mutual fund shares must meet the requirement of fair dealing
that the SEC and the NASD, a self-regulatory organisation, have established for all securities transactions in
the United States.  Fees charged by mutual funds are also subject to United States regulations.  In addition to45
federal regulations, mutual funds are subject to the “Blue Sky” laws of each state, which include, among
other provisions, restrictions on certain types of investments.
113. Regulation of the investment companies in Japan is conducted by the Ministry of Finance (MOF)
and a self-regulatory organisation, the Investment Trust Association.  Securities investment trusts (an
investment vehicle in many ways similar to a US mutual fund) are regulated along the lines of the
1951 Securities Investment Trust, as amended [14].  A securities investment trust is a contractual agreement
among four parties:  The investor who buys beneficiary certificates; the management company that issues
the certificates and decides on the investments of the trust; the securities company that sells the certificates;
and the trustee, which is a trust bank that manages the assets at the direction of the management company.
If an investment trust is an open type trust, investors can purchase new certificates, there is no specific
maturity date, and the size of the trust is not fixed.  A unit type of trust is somewhat similar to a closed-end
fund:  After it is issued at fixed cost per certificate, no new certificates are sold and no new money is raised.
The typical unit trust matures five years after issuing its certificates.  The MOF must license securities firms
(or subsidiaries) before they may act as the manager of a securities investment trust.
114. The regulatory situation in Western Europe has undergone important changes since the adoption
of the 1985 EU Directive on Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS).
The UCITS Directive stipulates which types of investment companies are allowed and which can advertise
and market their products across the EU area.  Moreover, it contains the co-ordination of an agreed upon set
of minimum standards for investor protection, leaving considerable scope for EU countries to compete with
each other.  Consequently, some EU countries have relatively liberal investment fund regulations (e.g.
Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg and The Netherlands) that are not in conflict with the minimum
standards of the UCITS Directive.  The draft 1993 Directive amending the 1985 UCITS Directive
investment fund companies would allow (i.e. when adopted) investment companies to advertise and market
MMMFs and funds-of-funds across the EU area.
115. The 1988 Luxembourg Investment Company Act provides considerable freedom to investment
companies regarding legal structure (contractual form, the joint stock company with variable capital or
SICAV form, the common fund or FCP form, or any other form of collective investment) and investment
objectives of the investment fund.  The Luxembourg law includes also regulation of funds that are not
covered by the UCITS Directive, including venture capital funds, derivatives funds, index funds, foreign
currency funds, family or group of funds, government securities funds, etc.  These non-UCITS funds are not
allowed to be advertised and marketed across the EU area.  Also, France has relatively liberal investment
fund rules.  Money market mutual funds (MMMFs) have grown spectacularly.  But other funds have also
grown steadily, including risk capital funds, funds-of-funds, index funds, and financial futures, options and
warrant funds.
116. More "conservative" European countries such as Germany and Switzerland have reacted to these
new initiatives and competition from other European countries by giving more freedom to investment
companies.  Germany allows now the operation of MMMF.  Existing investment funds have gained greater
flexibility to engage in derivatives transactions for risk management purposes;  they may invest up to 10 per
cent of total assets in unquoted financial assets.  The new Swiss Investment Fund Act of March 1994 has
considerably widened the scope for new investment fund products.  Both German and Swiss investment
funds have been expanding their presence in Luxembourg in response to investment fund restrictions at home
and, more important, to tax factors.
117. Restrictions on the distribution of investment fund products (including restrictions on cross-border
sales of products and services) are usually motivated by investor protection concerns.  Most OECD46
countries other than France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Switzerland and the United States, seem not to have
in place special regulations dealing with the sale and marketing of investment products.
118. In the United States the sale of investment fund products has traditionally been subject to tight and
detailed regulations.  The SEC is currently undertaking a comprehensive review of current disclosure
requirements.  In addition, the Commission is working on the development of a “fund profile”.  The profile
contains the fund’s key features in a standardised format designed to facilitate comparison among funds.
Another noteworthy development is that US legislators are currently considering a set of amendments to the
Investment Company Act designed to modernise certain aspects of mutual fund regulation, including the
authorisation to allow the SEC to create a new, more investor-friendly fund “advertising prospectus.  A final
point of regulatory attention for the authorities is the recent sharp surge in the sale of investment products
via the banking system.
119. The new Swiss Investment Fund Act covers the sale of investment products.  According to this
Act, foreign investment funds will be allowed to be marketed in Switzerland, provided that the fund
management companies from the home countries:  (i) have supervisory practices and investor protection
rules that are judged to be "equivalent" (not necessarily "identical" or "equal" ) to the one in Switzerland;
(ii) have a legal presence in Switzerland; and (iii) have sales practices in compliance with the new
Investment Act.
120. As noted above, the EU UCITS Directive allows the free distribution of UCIT-defined investment
fund products within the European Union.  However, many OECD countries have very detailed and complex
investor protection rules that inhibit at present the free cross-border sale of investment products.
121. Direct regulation of portfolio holdings of investment funds are largely in the form of constraints on
outward portfolio investments.  However, these constraints are usually formulated in terms of limits on
illiquid securities or in the form of asset diversification rules.  For example, in the United States a mutual
funds may not hold more than 15 per cent of its net assets in illiquid assets.47
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4 160 19 911.50 41.00 10 800.00 54.24 3.94
Prague 1 671 19 790.15 36.84 9 172.60 46.35 40.03
Warsaw 83 8 155.99 41.73 10.432.39 127.91 6.43
Bratislava 950 5 632.66 12.80 3 200.00 56.81 30.93
Budapest 45 5 269.09 12.23 3 031.99 57.54 12.55
Zagreb 68 1 359,12 n.a. 103.86 7.64 7.52
Ljubljana 52 1 229.47 0.58 145.25 11.81 7.32
Vilnius 350 899.93 0.33 47.23 5.25 8.98
Tallinn 16 896.20 1.39 366.30 40.87 18.80
Kiev 0 600.00 n.a. 17.00 2.83 1.38
Riga 34 115.23 0.12 11.67 10.13 2.34
Bucharest 21 72.64 0.24
5 6.24 8.60 0.28
Skopje 3 63.61 n.a. 0.40 0.63 1.83
Sofia 26 4.86 0.04
5 0.01 0.17 0.17
NYSE - 5 654 815.40 - 3 082 916.10 54.52 77.99
London - 1 346 640.70 - 1 153 221.30 85.64 121.32
Germany - 577 364.80 - 593 936.20 102.87 23.96
Paris - 499 989.60 - 716 507.60 143.30 32.25
Kuala Lumpur - 213 757.40 - 60 792.40 28.44 254.17
San Paulo - 147 635.80 - 57 024.50 38.62 21.94
Thailand - 135 774.20 - 59 303.30 43.68 81.31
Mexico - 90 694.00 - 35 037.20 38.63 37.63
Santiago - 72 927.70 - 11 411.60 15.66 108.36
Buenos Aires - 37 783.80 - 31 932.60 84.51 13.45
New Zealand - 31 949.80 - 8 718.00 27.28 54.89
1.  Data for comparative stock exchanges refer to 1995; 2.  Data for transition economies refer to listed and unlisted
shares while data for comparative stock exchanges refer to listed shares only; 3.  Exchange rate of 6 Jan. 1997; 4.
90 stocks on RTS-1 and 70 stocks on RTS-2, all other date refer to RTS-1 only.  Annual turnover is a projection of
Jan. 1997 total turnover; 5.  US$ thousands.
Source:  Individual stock exchanges.49
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